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Abstract. We discuss the problems related to access control in automated 
capture and access systems, which capture, store and retrieve information 
gathered through sensors in physical environments. We discuss several unique 
requirements that set capture and access apart from traditional information 
processing systems, and that make existing access control approaches such as 
role-based access control (RBAC) and digital rights management (DRM) 
unsuitable for this domain. Drawing from access control theory research, we 
devise an access control system that satisfies these requirements. Further, we 
describe its implementation within an existing capture and access system, and 
discuss emergent issues relating to retention time, rights management and 
information sharing. We argue that some traditional security requirements 
might not in fact be appropriate when applied to environmental captured 
information, due to the perceptual and social characteristics of such data. 
Finally, we provide an example of how this access control architecture might fit 
in a capture and access system composed of mobile devices. 
Introduction and Related Work 
Automated capture and access (CA2) systems have emerged from the need for many 
different ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) applications to support the collection and 
retrieval of information from the physical world, such as audio and video feeds, the 
location of individuals and objects, or other kinds of environmental information (e.g., 
temperature, concentration of airborne chemicals). Capture and access systems have 
been used to build, among others, recording applications for meetings [15] and 
classrooms [1], personal memory aid tools [12, 21, 8], and therapeutic support 
systems [23]. Design and architectural considerations are leading to the consolidation 
of collection and retrieval functions in generic infrastructural systems, similarly to 
data networking services, available to multiple applications. Due to their instrumental 
                                                       
1 This article is available at www.gvu.gatech.edu as Georgia Institute of Tchnology GVU 
Center Technical Report GIT-GVU-05-06. 
2 Not to be confused with the same acronym for Certification Authority. 
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nature, CA technologies are on their way to becoming one of the upcoming large 
information infrastructures. 
Securing collected data is an obvious requirement for CA systems. Privacy and 
security have represented concerns in the wider ubicomp community from the 
beginning of the ‘90s  [22, 2]. Early work concentrated mostly on social acceptability 
and legal issues, especially in relation to privacy, and access control has not been 
generally addressed due to the priority given to functional issues. Recently however, 
researchers has started analyzing access control problems in ubiquitous computing 
systems from various perspectives. For example, Sampemane et l. have shown how 
to employ generalized role-based access control (RBAC) to secure ubiquitous 
information services [20] (e.g., for annexing information or computing services 
overlaid with physical environments), and Covington has used environmental sensed 
data as inputs to RBAC evaluation functions [7]. As opposed to the two mentioned 
approaches, we are interested in providing access control for the information collected 
in physical environments — not for ubiquitous services — in a way appropriate to the 
perceptual characteristics of such data. 
We propose to associate a set of tokens to each environmental data item stored by 
the CA system; tokens are also distributed to the users who need to access the 
information. The user must subsequently show the token to the system in order to gain 
access to that data item. This approach is similar to the key-lock pair access control 
techniques first used in early multiprocessing systems and documented by Graham 
and Denning [10]. In that article, Graham and Denning also describe capability lists, 
in which each user is associated with a set of access capabilities on data and access 
control lists (or ACL), in which objects are associated with access permissions. 
However, our system differs from their key-lock approach in that users do not need to 
be identified ahead of time and tokens are automatically associated at the time of 
capture with incoming streaming data. Token-based access control also differs from 
capability lists in that the user, not the system, keeps track of tokens. Further, token-
based access control differs from both capability lists and ACL in that it does not 
require to identify users to evaluate the access control functions (i.e., to grant or deny 
access). 
Tokens can be thought of as “memory handles” which allow access only to the 
segments of information that a user chooses, or is allowed, to “remember,” as proven 
by retaining the token. The effectiveness of this access control scheme depends on 
how the captured data items are annotated with location and temporal attributes. 
Moreover, tokens have rather weak security properties in some respects. We argue 
below, however, that considering automated capture and access in its broader context, 
these weaknesses might be the result of the intrinsic nature of people’s understanding 
of everyday experience, and that it might be impossible to control such data 
exchanges by using any access control technique.  
Below, we present the requirements analysis of an access control system for CA 
applications and describe how we implemented it within an existing infrastructure 
system, the InCA toolkit [19]. We do expose how the structure of InCA has 
influenced part of the design of the access control system, and which aspects are 
independent of InCA. We further develop some comments on how access control 
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could be used in a variety of environmental capture applications, concentrating 
specifically on the case in which personal, portable terminals can be used as brokers 
between users and system components.  
Requirements 
The characteristics of CA systems make it hard to support access control by using 
traditional RBAC approaches, or discretionary access control (DAC, used e.g. for file 
access control in UNIX), mandatory access control (MAC, used e.g. in classified 
systems), or digital rights management (DRM) techniques, used for published 
multimedia data, due to a variety of reasons.  
First, CA systems used in ubicomp applications cannot assume that users are 
known before a certain recording takes place, and access to the information should be 
granted to anonymous users, or users identified by pseudonyms. Second, the 
architecture should allow sufficient flexibility in the definition of access policies to 
support the vast range of usage settings and applications supported by CA systems. 
Third, the access control system should support the unique properties of 
environmental information, including its relationship with the geographical and 
temporal locations of collection. Finally, the system’s implementation should be 
lightweight.  
Below, we discuss these requirements individually. This analysis is not intended to 
be exhaustive; rather, our intention is to highlight some of the unique characteristics 
brought on by environmental CA technology, to point out architectural implications, 
and to suggest some problematic areas in need of further investigation. 
Undefined user set  
The infrastructure should not assume that subjects can be identified, either as 
related to human users or as specific applications. This requirement can be broken 
down as follows. 
First, the presence of a specific user during automated capture often cannot be 
predicted; unplanned meetings in informal organizations are an example (e.g., friends, 
households, or even open formal organizations such as schools). Thus, access control 
methods which require prior registration with a centralized entity would not fit well 
with such applications. This includes traditional techniques like DAC and MAC, but 
also schemes specifically developed for ubicomp applications, such as Sampemane’s 
[20]. 
Second, diverse accessing entities should be supported by the access control 
method, including users and software processes, because ubicomp systems are 
composed of heterogeneous devices. This implies that the access control system 
should not make overly specific assumptions on the capabilities of the accessing 
entity, such as the ability to perform cryptographic operations. 
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Third, it should not be necessary to identify users of the information to control 
access to stored data. While anonymous and pseudonymous access control schemes 
are documented in the literature, they might not be appropriate for the present 
application. Specifically, unlinkable anonymous access control frameworks such as 
Idemix [4] require a trusted third party (TTP) to issue digitally signed access 
credentials, that are then blindly verified by the access control system. Given that a 
single semantic unit of information might include references to several hundreds or 
thousands of individual data items this would tax the capture and access with a high 
signature verification overhead if one credential were to be used for each accessed 
data item. On the other hand, if Idemix credentials were to be issued containing all 
access control permissions for a certain user, we still would have the problem of 
verifying access to individual items. Thus, we have chosen to employ a simpler 
technique that does not involve cryptography. However, it could be possible to 
integrate Idemix with our technique, in order to provide strong anonymity and limit 
the sharing of access credentials among different subjects. 
DRM techniques are used for access control to multimedia information, and could 
even be extended to “weak  anonymous”3 access control. However, DRM systems 
(such as those in current commercial use or those conformin g to specifications like 
[6]) tend to be very resource intensive, involving TTP, digital signature schemes and 
trusted implementations. Moreover, these systems are biased towards supporting 
relatively few publishers and many information consumers. Finally, information is 
published relatively rarely compared with the amount of times the information is 
accessed. In that perspective, concentrating the computational effort during the 
publishing phase results in a practical architecture.  
DRM systems might not be a viable option for ubiquitous CA because many 
assumptions are different; first, in CA environments, each user is potentially both a 
consumer and a publisher of information; second, in many CA applications the ratio 
between the occurrences of data generation and data access is much closer to 1; third, 
the data requiring access control are most typically continuous streams, as opposed to 
the discreet data model assumed in DRM systems (the copyrighted, published “piece 
of intellectual work”); finally, and most important, in many situations information 
generated by CA systems cannot be attributed to any single owner.  
Flexibility in the definition of access policies 
In ubicomp applications, vastly diverging usage needs might require unorthodox 
access control policies. Here, our intent is not that of defining any specific policy. Our 
objective is to describe a basic access control method that could, with the help of 
external rules, generically support many different policies required in automated CA. 
                                                       
3 Weak anonymity is defined in opposition to cryptographic, or “strong,” anonymity techniques 
[5]. Weak anonymity is not resistant against a concerted attack brought on by linking 
different access instances, but can be effectively used in real-world applications when it 
raises the cost of attack beyond what would be acceptable to an attacker. 
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To better understand the different usage context and policies for automated CA, 
consider the following three examples:  
1. In a classroom setting, the CA system could be used to store video and audio 
footage of lectures, which should be accessible by all students registered to the 
course (even if they are not present at one specific lecture) and by the instructors.  
2. Captured corporate meetings should be accessible by all individuals invited to the 
meeting; such a policy might not be trivial to implement: in many organizations, 
long meetings are composed of different sections, some of which might be 
confidential, and some individuals might be asked to temporarily leave the room. 
These persons should be allowed access to the portions of the meeting they 
attended and denied it to the remaining parts.  
3. A third example might involve capture in a private environment, where the owner 
of a dwelling might want to have access to captured information regardless of his 
or her presence at the time of capture.  
These examples show that an access control system for CA infrastructure should 
support at least content-based, location- and time-based, and identity-based policies:  
• Content-based policies should support access control based on the object of the 
environmental recording (e.g., all instances of lectures associated with a specific 
class). It should be noted that this policy is not necessarily connected with the 
location of capture, or the specific capture devices. In the classroom example, the 
class might gather in a different room or go on a field trip, so the access control 
should be independent of the location or the identity of the capture device. 
• Location and time-based access policies should grant to a user access to 
environmental information gathered when he or she was present, for example to 
support the above corporate meetings, or other “memory aid” applications which 
provide an archive of what happened during the presence of the individual for later 
use. 
• Identity-based policies are similar to current access control schemes based on true 
identities or pseudonyms, and should be supported as well. These traditional access 
control systems grant access based on the intrinsic identity of an individual or to 
his or her belonging to an organizational group or role. Given the unpredictable 
usage contexts of CA applications, these types of policies are not to be considered 
exhaustive: the system should be flexible enough to allow for future expansion. 
 
Support the unique properties of environmental capture information  
Environmental captured information is, by its very nature, subject to unique 
interpretation and understanding by users, based on the cont xt of capture (e.g., time, 
location, people present, activity involved, etc.). Ubicomp researchers have attempted 
to characterize these concepts by drawing from sociological and cognitive theories, 
and have been especially influenced by phenomenology (see for example [11]). The 
present work is inspired by the observations proposed in that context. 
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If the access control policy requires the physical presence of the principal (e.g., a 
user or his/her agent, or a process) at the time and location of capture to be granted 
later access, both the presence sensor and the access control policy must be 
sufficiently fine-grained to support “secure” determination for access control. For 
example, if access to recorded information is conditional on a person’s presence in a 
room, and a certain amount of time is sufficient to leave or enter that location (e.g., 
five seconds), access rights should refer to capture units of appropriate length. In this 
case, access control information should be associated to data segments as small as 
those containing five seconds of audio recording or video footage. A similar 
characterization of access to environmental information (i.e., granting access based on 
experiential determinations) has been recently proposed by Duan and Canny [9], who 
use the term “Data Discretion Principle” to describe it. Their proposal involves 
however the use of key sharing and encryption to enforce the principle. We are 
interested in understanding whether more lightweight techniques can be used that do 
not require the management burden associated with encryption technologies. While 
encryption could be used in our scheme for added protection (e.g., encrypting data in 
transit or in storage), we do not want our access control scheme to rely on it.  
This objective can be achieved in various ways. Access control policies associated 
to a long recording could specify subsets of the recording to which a principal is 
allowed access. This would however require the infrastructure to be able to interpret 
the data format of the stored information, to extract timing, location and other 
parameters relevant to the access control determination. An alternative would be 
requiring capture applications to segment environmental information in perceptually 
coherent chunks and store these chunks, instead of the complete uninterrupted 
recording. Access control can then be implemented on the chunks instead of on the 
whole recording, thus eliminating the need of interpreting the content of the recording 
itself.  
Lightweight implementation  
CA systems must support high bandwidth transactions, including multiple video 
and audio streams, as well as other kinds of potentially voluminous data flows. 
Moreover, in many situations, the stored information might be accessed only a few 
times in its lifetime within the system. Thus, expensive publishing schemes such as 
anonymous credentials or DRM might be inappropriate.  
System Design 
Given the requirements analysis outlined above, we decided not to base CA access 
control on identifiable users, but on “knowledge tokens.” As long as the accessing 
entity possesses the required token, it can access the stored information. We 
implemented the access control system as an integral part of InCA, an experimental 
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infrastructure for environmental capture and access that has been used in several 
research projects.  
We chose InCA as a test bed because it has been used in a variety of systems, over 
a lengthy timeframe, and it has been also used in actual “production” settings (e.g., 
class-room recording) [19, 14]. Furthermore, InCA code is readily available and 
modular, which greatly reduced the learning curve required in modifying some of its 
main components. As we explain below, however, the present work is not dependent 
on InCA itself: the concept of access tokens can be applied to other environmental 
capture technologies as long as relevant assumptions are met.  
Architectural considerations suggest that access control should be implemented at 
the same infrastructural level as the CA system. Access control support positioned 
lower in the infrastructural stack (e.g., operating system or database) does not provide 
sufficient flexibility for the type of information stored in CA systems, and higher 
level support might not guarantee effective enforcement. For this reason, the present 
access control mechanism was implemented as a component of an existing CA 
middleware solution.  
Description of InCA 
InCA is a system that provides abstractions for modeling capture, storage, delivery 
and query-based access to multi-media environmental information, including video, 
audio, digital ink strokes and text. The infrastructure is network-based, and is 
composed of a collection of independently running modules connected by a TCP 
network. InCA is a modular system, written in Java, composed of one core broker 
node (the InCA daemon), which runs at a well-known network address, and an 
arbitrary number of modules providing capture, access, control, observation, storage 
and transduction functions. (See Figure 1) 
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Data are collected by capture modules, and are tagged with (key, value)  
attribute pairs specifying the context of the capture, including location, time, people 
present, e.g. (“Location”, “Room 330”) . Data transit through the broker to a 
storage module where they are archived, either in core memory, or in a database. 
Typically, continuous data is stored in the infrastructure as short segments, to improve 
access precision, since data can be accessed only at the segment level, through its 
attributes. 
A query is made by an access module, usually part of the application making use of 
the data. Queries are evaluation functions of keys and values conjoined by logical 
operators, and are based on the attributes mentioned above (e.g. “all data with date ≥ 
Tuesday, Sept. 7, 2004 and room = Room 315 and building = Hall X”); usually these 
queries are generated programmatically, and not made directly by the user. The 
content of data items themselves is opaque to the infrastructure; thus, it is not possible 
to search on the contents of the data, but only on the associated attributes. Access 
modules request data from the InCA daemon, which contacts all registered storage 
modules for relevant data. All storage modules that hold relevant data return them to 
the daemon, which forwards them to the requesting access module. In addition, access 
modules can receive copies of the data at the time of capture if they have subscribed a 
prior query with the daemon. 
Controller and observer modules are used to control the functioning of the 
infrastructure (e.g., for activating or deactivating capture) and for observing its status 
(e.g., when a module joins or disconnects), but do not present access control issues of 
interest. Finally, transducer modules are used to translate data between formats, at the 
time of capture or once it is stored, e.g., translating raw audio footage into its 
transcript. Transducer modules can be modeled as composed of one access module 
and one capture module; nevertheless, they do present more complex access control 
issues, especially relating to token propagation between source and processed data. 
We do not however consider them here for the sake of brevity. 
The access control system 
Each data item stored in the CA system is associated with a (potentially different) set 
of secret tokens during the storage phase. The tokens are stored along with the 
environmental data and their attributes. Principals who are granted access to the 
stored data are provided with a copy of the relevant tokens.  
The central role of the InCA daemon makes it the prime candidate for 
implementing access control. In a decentralized system, access control would have to 
be implemented within storage modules. In keeping with the existing design 
philosophy, we implemented only the bare minimum enforcement code in the 
infrastructure itself; policy definitions are allocated in external access control 
manager modules. This module manages the relationship between the infrastructure 
and users and applications, translating high level access policies into control metadata 
amenable to the daemon. 
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In InCA all transactions occur through the use of queries on the context attributes 
associated with the data. Some context attributes are generated automatically (e.g., 
timestamp), but in general the capture application enriches the environmental data 
with specific and semantically dense information. The central role of queries in this 
system suggests to use them as the basis for the access control mechanism as well. 
Consequently, the structure and value of these attributes is integral to access control 
policy definition.  
The system provides flexibility in how the tokens can be associated with data items 
during storage. An external token manager is used for this purpose. (See Figure 2) 
Such a design meets the first two requirements above (unknown user set and 
flexibility), because the access policy can be defined externally to the infrastructure. 
Individually tagging data items allows maximum flexibility in the determination of 
whom to grant access to them. 
The token manager registers a set of tuples, composed of a condition and a set of 
tokens (condition, {tokens}) , with the infrastructure; after such registration 
phase, all subsequent data bound for storage and which satisfy any of the conditions 
will be tagged with the associated tokens (e.g.: tag all data for which “Location”  
equals “Room 330”  with tokens x  and y). Conditions, similarly to queries, are 
evaluation functions on the attributes of the data. More than one condition may match 
a certain data item: in that case, all pertinent tokens will be associated with the data. 
The registered tuples can be removed or updated by the token manager when 
necessary. Changes to the registered tuples apply to all information stored 
subsequently, until the next change. 
We make tokens opaque to the CA system to allow for generic implementations 
(the only operations required on the tokens are comparisons and conversions to and 
from strings for storage purposes). In a first version, tokens are pseudorandom 128 bit 
strings. Tokens are not generated within the capture module or the infrastructure, but 
in the token manager, in order to separate concerns between capture, access control 





















1. (condition, {tokens})  
2. (data)  
3.(data, {tokens})  Capture 
Module 
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When a query for data is made (see Figure 3), the system examines the tokens 
associated with the data matching the query (step 5). If no tokens are associated with 
the stored data, access is granted (this maintains compatibility with existing 
applications, and is consistent with the view of tokens as conditions on future access 
to the data). If any tokens are present with the stored data, then only those data items 
are returned to the requesting application for which the application has demonstrated 
to possess at least one of the stored tokens. If the application did not provide 
satisfactory tokens, the query returns the null set (just as if the requested data did not 
exist). Principals indicate their possession of tokens by loading a set of known tokens 
into the system prior to making a query for environmental data (step 1). Figure 4 
shows this same concept, comparing a traditional DAC access control matrix with 
token-based access control [10]. 
The potentially large number of tokens accumulated by CA applications presents 
the classic problems of large capability lists [10]. For this reason, principals should 
keep track of which tokens are relevant for a specific query (or group of queries), for 
example by grouping them by time, location or type of application, and load only 
tokens which are likely to be relevant into the system. Similarly, on the server side, 
data items may have a large number of associated tokens (this is similar to the classic 
problem of large access control lists). While the underlying database system provides 
fast search tools, this could nevertheless represent a bottleneck and would have to be 
addressed in a robust deployment (e.g., by organizing tokens in binary search 
structures). 
Above, we mentioned two alternatives for access control granularity on sensed 
data, namely, associating access control to portions of uninterrupted data streams, or 
to coherent chunks (in whatever dimension makes sense for the access control 
determination, e.g., time and space). In our implementation, we adopted the latter 
solution because in InCA single data items are opaque once they enter the 
infrastructure, and the data model favors the segmentation of data streams in chunks 
(to increase access efficiency and precision). This however need not be: our token-
based system could be adapted to CA systems handling continuous media as long as 
the following prerequisites are satisfied: 1) it is possible to address segments that are 
perceptually distinct for access control purposes (e.g., 1 minute intervals of a video 
recording), and 2) it is possible to evaluate an access control function on each 
segment of interest. In this situation, tokens would not refer to physically distinct data 
objects, but to parts of data streams, which would need to be extracted from the data 
 
 Fig. 3. Left, a typical access control matrix A for controlling read/write on objects; read access 
is granted to if ‘Read’ ∈ A[User, Object] . Right, an access matrix B for token-based 
access control scheme; access is granted if Token ∈ B[Object] . Note that there are no 
users, and that this scheme only controls read a ccess (write access could be easily added, by 
associating an access mode to tokens). 
A Object X Object Y 
User 1 Read, Write -, Write 
User 2 Read, - -,- 
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streams by the infrastructure before returning them to the requesting entity. In any 
case, the fundamental property of tokens is that they represent an access permission to 
a specific portion of environmental data. 
Finally, this system satisfies also the fourth requirement stated above, namely that 
the access control method be sufficiently lightweight. The only requirement for 
accessing stored information is the ability to store tokens, along with some related 
contextual information. The quantity of these tokens can be relatively large, but proxy 
services or functions can be used to reduce the amount of storage space required (.g., 
computing tokens based on a user secret (or password) and the query to the data, or 
storing the tokens within a broker service). 
The external token manager supports a variety of setups in how the tokens can be 
generated and distributed, as shown by the following two examples. 
Example 1. The token manager creates a new (random) token for accessing the 
information that is currently being stored each 10 seconds. These tokens are 
distributed to all principals present in the environment where the capture takes place, 
via a short-range wireless broadcast or line-of-sight communication mechanism. The 
tokens are collected by an agent on behalf of the principal (e.g., an application 
running on an individual’s cell phone or PDA). The users then use the collected 
tokens to access the stored information (e.g., the recording of a meeting) at a later 
time. If a user leaves the environment, he or she will not be able to access the 
information, unless another knowledgeable individual provides him or her with the 
relevant tokens. 
Example 2. The tokens are generated individually for each principal (thus, allowing 
to distinguish different users, but not necessarily compromising weak anonymity), 
















2. (query)  
3. (query)  
1. ({tokens})  
4. (data,  
{stored tokens})  
5. for each data item in 4.:  
for each token in ({stored 
tokens}) : 
verify that at least one equal 
token exists in ({tokens}) 
6. return all matching 
(data) that satisfy 5. 
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For example, present individuals may register with the token manager by typing an 
individual secret on a publicly available terminal in the conference room. The secret 
is then converted to a token using a well-known method, (e.g., a secure hash 
function). Principals will need to remember such secret for further access to the data. 
Clearly, knowledge-based and identity-based token generation algorithms can be 
combined to support more complex usage scenarios.  
In both examples, user identity authentication can be achieved by associating tokens 
to strong identity credentials (i.e., generating them based on an individual secret 
which is expensive to disclose). Furthermore, a broker system, accessible through 
user authentication, could store the tokens associated with a specific individual, thus 
supporting a traditional access control policy. 
Discussion 
If viewed from a traditional security perspective, it is straightforward to identify 
weaknesses regarding the access control system described above, the most important 
being 1) that the described system does not allow to modify access permissions once 
they have been granted, 2) that it does not restrict principals from trading tokens in 
order to gain unintended access to information, and 3) that it only controls access 
(read) rights and not modification or deletion of data. We claim that the usage context 
and characteristics of CA require to step back and reconsider whether it makes sense 
at all to consider these three points as security issues. Although a variety of other 
issues can be pinpointed (vulnerability to replay attacks, to exhaustive search attacks, 
to impersonation attacks by modules, to eavesdropping communications among 
modules, etc.) we will concentrate on these three because they are most salient to the 
properties of ubicomp applications. 
Modification of access rights 
The current implementation does not allow to change access rights once they have 
been granted. This property is somewhat symmetric to what happens in the Chinese 
Wall policy [3], in which access rights cannot be changed once the user performs 
certain actions. Although it is indeed possible to extend the proposed access control 
system with an access rights manager that implements such requirement, by removing 
specific access tokens related to a principal (if such relationship is known), we would 
like to make here a different point, namely, that the perceptual qualities of physically 
sensed information are phenomenologically incompatible with rights revocation. In 
fact, if we view physical environmental data collection as a memory augmentation 
system, requiring to remit access rights might be akin to requiring to forcefully forget
the memory of a certain experience or event. 
Currently legal arrangements do exist, which require such performances by 
individuals and organizations (e.g., non-disclosure agreements, retention limitations 
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in personal data protection regulation, etc.). The classic example is that of an 
individual leaving a certain organization and surrendering the access rights to 
information which is property of the organization. Their effectiveness is, however, 
based on their underpinning social framework, and only partially on technological 
enforcement. In many “open” applications, on the contrary, the ability to preserve 
access rights to environmental information for all involved stakeholders would avoid 
the social risk of a “privatization of experience”. Thus, not providing the ability to 
revoke access rights could as well be justified as a deliberate design choice. We 
would like to stress that we are not advocating the validity of one particular view; our 
intent is just to highlight how social and cognitive considerations about the collection 
of environmental information can have profound implications on the design of access 
control systems. 
Token trading 
The second main weakness of the proposed access control infrastructure is that 
lacking an externally defined policy (e.g., by implementing a custom token manager 
and broker), the system does not discourage principals to trade tokens in order to 
access other’s data. While password trading happens also in traditional systems, it is 
curbed by the significant trust and responsibility risks bound to the fact that 
passwords grant access to the entire data and identity of the users. Tokens only relate 
to a limited set of data items and are thus less risky to disclose. Nevertheless, an 
argument grounded on the properties of captured environmental information, as 
perceived by individuals, can explain how such deficiency might be acceptable. If 
environmental capture is likened to a memory augmentation technology, trading 
tokens might be viewed as a technologically empowered way of disclosing to a third 
party what happened at a certain place and time. The disclosing individual might not 
have any control on how the third party may subsequently use that knowledge. 
Clearly, the richness of the recorded information (e.g., video/audio footage) could 
grant it an entirely different legal and social status than what usually associated to 
verbally transmitted recollections (“hearsay”). This difference is one of the most 
interesting social implications of ubicomp technologies [17]. The unique properties of 
rich environmental data transcend access control issues; in fact, independently of the 
particular mechanism adopted, access control alone is insufficient for protecting 
individuals from unwarranted disclosures, lacking a social and organizational 
underlying framework. This leads us to uncharted legal waters, pertaining to how 
individuals expectations of privacy are defined and modified in environments where 
high-fidelity recordings of actions and utterances take place. What we would like to 
stress here is that independently of the access control method, the interplay of 
environmental recordings with social customs does unsettle established privacy 
balances. Whatever the access control policy might be, it needs to be complemented 
with appropriate social norms, rules and practices. 
An additional interesting property of the system, which can be also justified using 
phenomenological arguments, is that if nobody (be it a principal, or the token 
manager) collects and saves the tokens used during capture, that information will not 
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be accessible to any principal. Such a situation might arise because nobody is 
interested in the collected information, but also if the tokens have been lost or 
destroyed. Thus, in such a CA environment, users might adopt a conservative 
approach and collect all generated tokens, and decide later whether to keep them or 
not. This is possible with our access control system. For example, if a CA system is 
employed in security applications, such as surveillance, a token manager (which 
effectively implements access policies) could collect and securely store all tokens 
generated in the capture activity for later review, or always register a “master token” 
to be used later when particular circumstances (e.g., an outstanding warrant) require 
to access stored data.  
Control on retention and modification 
Data retention policies play an important role in CA systems, as CA systems can be 
used to collect large amounts of personal information. Data retention time is a concept 
introduced by data protection legislation as a fundamental privacy-enhancing 
principle [16]. It refers to the length of time that personal information is kept stored 
before being destroyed. Such duration is connected to the intended uses of the 
information, which must be spelled out in advance of collection: in general personal 
information may be stored for no longer than is necessary to carry out the declared 
purpose. However, in CA systems, different principals with an interest in the data 
might have diverging opinions on the appropriate uses, and thus on the retention time 
for stored data.  
Even if such a compromise could be met as a precondition to collecting the data, a 
principal might have a direct interest in amending or destroying previously stored 
environmental information. So data retention interacts with access control, because 
access rights to environmental information may also include the rights to amend or 
destroy the information. For example, one individual might want to eliminate footage 
that could be interpreted as socially inappropriate, or potential ground for litigation. In 
such case, a removal function in InCA could verify that the principal requesting the 
deletion or substitution of the data does possess the appropriate rights, similarly to 
what happens before granting access for retrieving data from storage. This would 
require to augment stored tokens with access rights such as “delete,” “write” and 
“append”. 
Such a scenario, however, raises the question of how to reconcile divergent 
requests such as a principal asking to delete a certain portion of video footage that are 
of interest to others. Arguably, the quality of the “access rights” described in this 
section refer to emergent stakeholder rights, rather than to rights granted by authority, 
but it is not clear what rights should be granted to principals within CA spaces. 
Arbitration and adjudication issues have hitherto been only scratched by the ubicomp 
research community [13], and the ethical implications of amending or deleting 
portions of environmental recordings with multiple stakeholders are still unsolved. 
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For these reasons we have decided only to concentrate on access rights, and not on 
editing or removal.4 
Summary 
Our research has led us to the conclusion that rather than trying to enforce strong 
security in ubicomp systems, it is more productive to focus on misuse prevention, 
damage reduction and redress, by employing a mix of technical and social measures. 
The system proposed here should be assessed in this perspective: while it does not 
afford the level of security of a strictly administered operating system in a disciplined 
organization, when coupled with sound policies (implemented technically in token 
managers and within the organization that used the CA system) it can provide 
sufficient security for many CA applications. The system based on secret tokens is 
both lightweight, and expansive. It is lightweight because it does not impose strong 
requirements on the accessing entities. It is expansive because it tends to favor the 
diffusion of information rather than restricting it, and relies on social barriers to curb 
such diffusion to a socially acceptable rate, by requiring explicit trading of tokens, 
similarly to how we communicate our everyday experience. In this, it is similar to 
Povey’s optimistic security [18], in which access rights are granted by default and 
abuse is controlled and if necessary remedied through subsequent audit. However, 
unlike that approach, our does not rely on the audit support (including principal 
identification) necessary to prosecute abuse, given the loose administrative 
environment of ubicomp applications which is ill-suited to enforcing centralized and 
secure audit functions. 
Sample Application 
We finally discuss an example of how the proposed access control system could be 
used to define complex policies in an environment populated by mobile CA devices. 
The purpose of this is both to detail the working environment of CA systems and to 
show how the lightweight system described here could be applied to such an 
architectural setup. 
Mobile CA is of interest because mobile devices are becoming increasingly 
powerful, both in terms of capture and storage capabilities. Their increased power 
allows them to work within CA systems, which had been previously restricted to 
high-performance, dedicated, fixed computing systems. The personal nature of these 
devices, and the fact that people are growing increasingly accustomed to carrying 
them constantly (consider cell phones) make them excellent candidates as remote 
sensors, personal wallets, and for implementing agent-like functions like collecting 
                                                       
4 As a more general comment, the role of the data subject in data protection legislation might 
need to be adapted to these new technologies, which expose situations where multiple 
individuals can claim privacy rights on information. 
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access tokens. Mobile devices incorporating all CA functions have been deployed 
[12] in a restricted configuration. Although in the cited case the CA application is 
integrated onto a single software module and does not support network 
communication, advanced systems will soon allow access to other devices both 
remote and present in the environment. 
Architectural considerations suggest to analyze a mobile capture environment in 
terms of the location of relevant system components, namely the mobile device and a 
fixed infrastructure. We discuss the case in which the mobile device captures, stores 
and provides access to captured information (see below for comments on other 
architectures). The personal nature of mobile devices biases the access control policy 
through its intrinsic affordances (namely, the fact that the device is in continuous 
physical control of its owner). However, introducing a token distribution system can 
enable several useful policies. 
Access tokens transmitted through out-of-band means (e.g., by infrared 
communication) could support access policies which are perceptually understandable 
by their users. Tokens distributed in such a way may allow only devices present in the 
same environment to access the data stored by the mobile CA system, similarly to 
making a copy of minutes for all participants to a meeting. In this configuration, the 
capture module and token manager reside on the user’s device. Other devices in the 
environment receive tokens from the token manager, and can later use these tokens to 
access information stored on the original capture device, even by accessing it 
remotely. Depending on the specific policy regulating environmental capture in a 
certain place or situation, all mobile devices present in the environment might be 
informed about the data capture, and provided with the appropriate access tokens. It is 
also possible to constrain the set of token recipients based on some condition (e.g., 
that they identify themselves to the token manager). 
An alternate configuration would have each client device run its own token 
manager, which imposes its access policy on the capturing device. In this case, the 
CA infrastructure on the capture device could require specific conditions to be met on 
the token managers on client devices, before allowing them to impose tokens on the 
data. This system would allow later access, and might be more suitable for 
anonymous access, since the tokens are generated at the client side. Both cases 
described here assume that the capturing device honors access requests. 
If the capture device itself does not have a token manager to introduce its own 
tokens during capture, a permission-based policy could be envisioned, where the 
owner of the capture device would need to ask a token holder permit to access the 
recording. More complex permission policies (e.g., that all people present to a 
meeting grant permission) would be possible only by changing the core 
token/condition evaluation algorithm. For example, this could be achieved by adding 
a different type of tokens that must be all presented in order to gain access, as 
opposed to the current setup, which requires that only one access token match the 
stored tokens.  
Various other architectures are possible, including: mobile capture and fixed-
infrastructure storage and access (useful in open space); fixed-infrastructure capture 
and mobile storage (useful for exploiting high-quality fixed sensors); and the mobile 
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device as a control system for environmental data flowing among various fixed-
infrastructure components. Although we do not report on these, preliminary analysis 
suggests that token-based access control could be effectively used for securing these 
applications as well. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
We have shown how the unique characteristics and requirements of environmental 
capture and access systems call for revising our traditional concepts of access control 
in information systems. The access control system proposed in this article is not 
intended to be a secure or complete implementation. Instead, we hope that the 
requirements analysis and sample applications presented here and the rationale for our 
design decisions can be useful as a base for future work. In particular, the undefined 
and potentially unlimited user set, the need for flexible policy implementation, and 
the specific social and perceptual qualities of information sensed from physical 
environments represent challenges that cannot be solved simply by applying existing 
models such as RBAC or DRM. 
The discussion revealed that the proposed system falls short with relation to several 
security requirements, including the ability to change access control policies after the 
fact, the impossibility of limiting token proliferation, and the lack of access control 
for write and delete operations. However, arguments were provided to point out how 
it might not be possible to meet some of these requirements even with traditional 
access control systems and that, in general, these security concerns could be 
misplaced or even irrelevant to the specific usage contexts and applications of 
environmental information. Specifically, we highlighted the need for practical 
security systems able to curb misuse rather than assure high-grade confidentiality. 
In our current and future work we are focusing on expanding our understanding of 
both technical and social needs, norms and rules impacting environmental capture and 
access security and privacy. We are interested in the role of mobile devices within 
larger CA systems, both as agents of control by the owners, and as risk factors for 
third parties. Specifically, we intend to study how social, cognitive and legal needs 
and constraints impact system design and security choices such access control. We 
plan to extend the token-based access control model to support CA of audio and video 
for personal purposes by individuals using mobile, networked devices. 
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